UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-10-2011

Rammell v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
38724

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Rammell v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 38724" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3601.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3601

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Supreme Court Case No. 38724

REX RAMMELL and LYNDA RAMMELL, Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants, Appellants,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO; JAMES E. RISCH, STEVEN HUFFAKER; and
DOES I-X,
Defendants and Counterclaimants, Respondents.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District court of the Fourth Judicial District for Ada County
Case No. CV- OC-2008-20694

Patrick D. Furey
Attorney at Law
ISB No. 2427
301 E. Brookhollow Dr.
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 368-0855
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

Lawrence G. Wasden
Idaho Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
Michael E. Kelly
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street - Ste. 100
P.O. Box 856
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-4300
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Supreme Court Case No. 38724

REX RAMMELL and LYNDA RAMMELL, Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants, Appellants,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO; JAMES E. RISCH, STEVEN HUFFAKER; and
DOES I-X,
Defendants and Counterclaimants, Respondents.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District court of the Fourth Judicial District for Ada County
Case No. CV- OC-2008-20694

Patrick D. Furey
Attorney at Law
ISB No. 2427
301 E. Brookhollow Dr.
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 368-0855
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

Lawrence G. Wasden
Idaho Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
Michael E. Kelly
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street - Ste. 100
P.O. Box 856
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-4300
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.
The defendants' refusal to address the governing statutes and administrative rules doesn't
avoid their application ............. ,. " .............................................................. , ........ .1
2.

Red Herrings ............................................................................................... 2

3.
Defendants may now regret framing the issue the lower court accepted as violation of a
"reasonable time," but that's how they framed it and trying to recant now doesn't avoid the
applicable Rule's provision for "timely, as determined by the Administrator," anyway ............ 6
4.
The fact the Governor's office is authorized to issue executive orders does not mean the
Governor can permissibly destroy private property, without just compensation of its owner,
absent any authority for such destruction ................................................................... 8
5.
The private individuals the State enlisted to help slaughter plaintiffs' livestock were not
"licensed hunters" as the term is used in I.C. §25-3705A(3) .......................................... .10
6.
Defendant Risch could not have "reasonably but mistakenly" believed that his conduct
did not violate plaintiffs' clearly established property rights ........................................... 13
7.

Attorney fees ............ '" ......................................................................... .14

8.

Reassignment on remand .......................................................................... .15

Conclusion .................................................................................................... 15

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Asea, Inc., v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. Cal. 1981) ...... '" ....... 11
In Re Katrina Canal Breach Litigation, 2007 WL 195193, 1-2 (2007) .............................. 11
Miller v. Holzmann, 240 F.R.D. 1,4 (D. D.C. 2006) ................................................... 11
Jackson v. City o/Pittsburg, 2010 WL 2347085 at 6-7 (2010) ....................................... 14

Statutes
Idaho Code, Title 25, Chapter 23 ................................................................................................ 2,9
Idaho Code, § 25-3701 ........................................................................................ 9
Idaho Code § 25-3703 ................................................................................................................... 27
Idaho Code § 25-3705 A ......................................................................................... 2,3,4,5, 12,13
Idaho Code § 25-2705A (3) ............................................................................................ 7,8, 10, 14

Rules
IDAPA 02.04.19.204.05 ................................................................................................................ 7,
IDAPA 02.04.19.305.01 ............................................................................................................. 1, 7

ii

1.
The defendants' refusal to address the governing statutes
and administrative rules doesn't avoid their application.

Defendants/respondents got one thing mostly right in their brief:
"[T]he Rammells have renewed the argument that they made below, which the
District Court did not address. That argument is that Idaho's law, as written both its statutes and promulgated rules and regulations - simply did not allow
the State to kill their escaped animals, either by the direct action of the State's
agents, or by the State-authorized depredation hunt that took place under rules
that were promulgated by the Idaho Department of Fish and Game; both being
actions that were authorized [sic: "ordered"] by the Governor's September 7,
2006, executive order (R., pp. 444-54)."
Respondents' Brief at 16, emphasis added.

Perhaps thinking if it worked for the lower court it

might work here, defendants eschew any quotation or discussion whatsoever of the actual

language of I.C. §25-3705A or, for that matter, any of the statutes or administrative rules that
govern livestock generally or domestic elk in particular.
Instead what we see from defendants on appeal is the mirror image of what transpired
below: In the lower court, the State and its former governor simply placed their ipse dixit
conclusion (,'We win") before the lower court, which agreed. Here, they simply place the lower
court's ipse dixit conclusion ("Defendants win") before this Court in the hope it, too, will simply
give them what they ask without addressing the reality that obtains in this case:
A. The only provisions in the entire Idaho Code and Administrative Rules that authorize
the actual destruction of domestic elk are those pertaining to animals that are actually found to
be "infected, or affected with, or exposed to an animal health emergency disease" (IDAP A
02.04.19.305.01).
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B. There was never any such finding of disease or so much as a scintilla of evidence that
would even suggest such a finding.
C.

Nobody but the lower court, in its gratuitous footnote 7 (R., p. 114), has ever so

much as suggested that escaped livestock - whether domestic elk or otherwise - constitute any
"public nuisance" and an entire chapter of the Idaho Code, Title 25, Chapter 23, makes it plain
they do not.
D.

The only "authority" urged by the defendants or the court below for the intentional

destruction of plaintiffs property was I.e. §25-3705A, the "seven day" provision of which is by
its plain language for the protection of the ordinary licensed hunter who, while in compliance
with all Fish and Game rules and regulations, takes an escaped domestic animal instead of a wild
one. And finally,
E.

The only authority given by the legislature to the State pertaining to escaped

domestic elk is the authority to capture them, and then only where the Administrator has made a
fact-specific determination the owner has failed to do so in a "timely" (not "seven-day") manner.
Then entry of summary judgment must be reversed.

2.

Red herrings.

Struggling (and failing) to muster anything to even urge in any genuine defense of their
summary judgment, defendants try the next best thing: They trumpet the fact plaintiff hasn't
contested the obvious - and obviously immaterial - fact the statute as written is perfectly
constitutional.

First they quote the lower court's "finding" of that which was uncontested,

whereupon they imply plaintiffs briefing has been done with invisible ink:

* * *
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"I fInd that because the legislature - legislative actions in passing
2S-370SA and not - and in not providing compensation are

constitutionally proper under the public nuisance doctrine. The
statute itself is constitutional and it doesn't sound to me like the
Rammells really argue that it's not constitutional. They just argue
about what it means.
MR. FUREY: That's correct.
THE COURT:
Okay. But I'm going to make a
finding that it is constitutional. And therefore, the court is going
to dismiss all cause of action based on any takings claims, which
would be Counts One and Two.
[December 16,2010, Tr., p. 48, L. 14 - p. 49, L. 2.]
On this appeal, the Rammell Appellants have not directly challenged the
District Court's decision and holding, as set out immediately above, that the
State's actions did not constitute an unconstitutional taking of the Rammells'
property without payment of just compensation, or the district court's fInding the
'escape' of those animals from confInement itself was sufficient justifIcation for
the State's actions."
Respondents' Brief at IS - 16, emphasis added.

And just before, they also declared the

unremarkable reality of the statute's uncontested constitutionality as an "essential" fInding:
"The essential fmdings of the district court in support of its grant of the State's
summary judgment motion are set out as follows:
The court finds that it [I.e. §2S-370SA] is constitutional, and
therefore, the state did not violate the takings clause or due process
clauses of either the state or the federal constitution or of the
eminent domain clause of the state constitution."

* * *
Respondents' Brief at 14, emphasis added.
Since neither the defendants nor the lower court ever did address the actual language of
the statutes and rules here involved, their foregoing arguments will serve as well as any to
illustrate just how far they had to stretch to reach the result they did in this case.

The

statutes

and rules authorize only capture and fines for the "unduly lengthy" escape of domestic elk.
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They don't authorize their destruction. The fact those statutes and rules are constitutional is as
off-point and immaterial as would be some "finding" they were duly passed by a majority. The
unchallenged constitutionality of I.e. § 25-3705A was the best defendants or the lower court
could muster, however, so when plaintiffs counsel passed on the court's invitation to argue
against its clear constitutionality, the court made its "finding" anyway - while pointedly ignoring
"the argument [plaintiff) made below, which the District Court did not address."

(See

Respondents' Brief at 16.) It sure didn't, and that is no way for trial courts to decide cases.
The same exposure lies with respect to the lower court's attachment of significance to the
fact the "legislative action in passing 25-3705A and . . . not providing compensation" is
constitutional.

Any reading of the statutory and regulatory schemes (attached to plaintiffs

opening brief as an Appendix) discloses why the legislature, when enacting

I.e.

§25-3705A,

didn't "provide for compensation": the statute doesn't authorize any taking or destruction of
property to compensate for. Again, that is entirely constitutional and entirely beside the point.
Finally, defendants seek shelter in the lower court's suggestions of "public nuisance" and
"public necessity."

As to the former, they offer the quote repeated above, i.e., " . . .

constitutionally proper under the public nuisance doctrine." As noted in plaintiffs opening brief,
however, the suggestion of "public nuisance" finds no existence, support, justification or
rationale anyplace in this entire case other than the lower court's gratuitous footnote 7 of its
Order Re: Motion to Dismiss (R., 114) noting that such a doctrine does exist in the common law.
Nothing about the existence of a doctrine, however, makes it applicable in a case absent some
facts (and uncontroverted ones at that, if summary judgment is to be entered) that make it
applicable, and there are no such facts anywhere in the record in this case.
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With respect to the defendants' and the lower court's attempt to justify the defendants'
acts by means of the "public necessity doctrine," they again offer nothing but ipse dixit - instead
of any facts, let alone any uncontroverted ones - to support applicability of the doctrine. And in
this the lower court actually ran headlong up against itself when it sought to justify imposition of
an attorney fee award on a basis directly at odds with what it had said before on the exact same
subject, albeit in a different context. Defendants quote the lower court as follows in their brief at
28:

"In this Court's Order regarding Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, dated April 29,
2009, the Rammells were clearly and unequivocally advised that no reasonable
basis in fact or law existed with respect to their claims against the State or the
individual defendants. In fact, even as to the 'taking' claims against the State, the
Court put them on notice that under the public necessity doctrine, it was unlikely
that would survive." [June 3, 2011, Order Granting Costs and Fees in Part] (R.,
681-682).
Emphasis added. A year and a half earlier, though, when the lower court on April 29, 2009, was
granting most of the defendants' Motion to Dismiss (based in part on its baseless and gratuitous
assertion the escaped livestock were "believed to be diseased"), it did at least acknowledge the
language of I.e. §25-3705A and observed - correctly - that it did not serve as any codification
of the public necessity doctrine:
"Finally, even the language of LC. §25-3705A itself appears to indicate an
intention to insulate licensed hunters, and the state agencies who licensed those
hunters, from liability for inadvertently killing and taking domestic cervidae that
have escaped for more than seven (7) days, not to serve as a codification of a
version of the public necessity doctrine."
(R., p. 114, emphasis added.)

It is telling that the same lower court who wrote the above en

route to disposing of most of plaintiffs case on its own assertion they were "believed to be
diseased," would then - after the defendants reminded her they had intentionally, rather than
inadvertently, destroyed plaintiffs valuable property (R. p. 230) and after plaintiffs had howled

APPELLANTS' REPL Y BRIEF - 5

about her "believed to be diseased" handout -

state the following from the bench at the

December 16, 2010, hearing:
"I don't think it's ambiguous. I do agree with [plaintiffs] counsel, it's not
ambiguous, but I think his interpretation is just flat wrong.
And, like I said, it makes no sense that if it's just to preclude accidental taking,
then you wouldn't need the seven days and you wouldn't need the proclamation.
They would just have to be escaped. And they could say that. They could have
easily said if there's an accidental taking by a licensed hunter who was in
compliance with Title 36 of a domesticated - a domestic cervidae who has
escaped regardless of how long it is, then that - they could certainly do that.
That's not what they did."
December 16,2010, Tr., p. 46, L. 18 - p. 47, L. 6. None of the purported bases defendants urge
allowing the summary judgment to stand has merit, no matter how many different ones they try
on.

3.

Defendants may now regret framing the issue the lower court accepted as
violation of a "reasonable time," but that's how they framed it and trying to
recant now doesn't avoid the applicable Rule's provision for
"timely, as determined by the Administrator," anyway.

Defendants are clearly struggling: On the one hand, they themselves framed the issue
below as "the question that is now renewed on this motion for summary judgment is whether the
[plaintiffs] can sustain their taking claims in the face of evidence l presented by the defendants
that the [plaintiffs'] failure to recapture their escaped animals within a reasonable time created a
public nuisance that the defendants were entitled to abate without the payment of any
compensation to the [plaintiffs]." (R., p. 229.) Haunted now by the fact determinations of what
is reasonable almost always present questions of fact which cannot properly be disposed of on
summary judgment, defendants now insist:

1

They never really say what evidence; it is hoped the Court will ask them at argument.
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"The State has consistently taken the position in this case that the seven day
period established in I.C. §25-3705A(3) and the administrative regulations
adopted thereunder, is the reasonable period of time allowed for the recapture of
escaped domestic elk before the State may act to take those animals without the
payment of compensation to the owner."
Respondents' brief at 19, emphasis added. So they have, but even if the Court accepts their
invitation to pretend they didn't frame the issue the way they did (and the way the lower court
apparently accepted, since it gave them what they asked for), they still must lose. Section 253 705A(3), as explained almost ad nauseum in this case, has nothing to do with authorizing the
State to sally forth and summarily and intentionally destroy a rancher's livestock simply for
being "out."

Administrative Rule 204.05, on the other hand, specifically covers the exact

situation presented by a too-long-running escape of domestic elk.

It provides that if the

Administrator determines the rancher has been unable to get his stock back in in a "timely"
manner, then the State can capture - not slaughter - them:
Capture. In the event that the owner or operator of a domestic cervidae ranch is
unable to retrieve escaped domestic cervidae in a timely manner, as determined by
the Administrator, the Administrator may effectuate the capture of the escaped
domestic cervidae to ensure the health of Idaho's livestock and wild cervidae
populations.
That is what the Rule says; that is what the Rule means; and what the defendants now wish it
said and meant is of no moment. What matters is that timeliness is a particularly fact-dependent
thing, as no less a light than the actual Administrator himself unequivocally testified.

And

absent an actual determination that an escaped animal has in fact been "infected, or affected with,
or exposed to an animal health emergency disease," IDAPA 02.04.19.305.01, two immutable
truths obtain: (1) The State has no authority to do anything unless "the owner is unable to
retrieve escaped domestic cervidae in a timely manner, which is a determination that must be
made by the Administrator based on the particular facts of the case and (2) Even
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if the facts of

the particular case lead the Administrator to make such a determination, the extent of what the
State is authorized to do about it is very limited: the Administrator may effectuate capture of the
escaped stock. Nowhere does any provision of the Idaho Code or the administrative rules
authorize the State-sponsored destruction of escaped domestic elk simply for being "o"ut" regardless of the duration for which they have accordingly been rendered strays. Defendants
admit:
"The State has consistently taken the position in this case that the seven day
period established in I.C. §25-3705A(3), and the administrative regulations
adopted thereunder, is the reasonable period of time allowed for the recapture of
escaped domestic elk before the State may act to take those animals without
payment of compensation to the owner."
Respondents' Brief at 19. That position, however, is simply wrong.
4.
The fact the Governor's office is authorized to issue executive orders
does not mean the Governor can permissibly destroy private property, without
just compensation of its owner, absent any authority for such destruction.
Consistent with their complete failure to address the language of any of the statutes or
administrative rules that apply to this case, defendants offer as an alternative the fact the law
does provide for the issuance of executive orders:
"In the State's initial memorandum that was submitted in support of its motion to
dismiss the Rammells' original Complaint, the State declared the authority of the
Governor to issue executive orders as authorized by Article IV, Section 5 of the
Idaho Constitution, and by I.C. §67-802. (R., pg. 70). No issue has previously
emerged in this case, as argued below, and no issue has been presented by the
Rammells on this appeal, that has challenged the authority of the Governor to
exercise his executive order authority to see that the laws are faitlifully executed.
On this essential question, the Rammells and the State have diverged as to both
the argument that the Rammells presented to the District Court below, and as to
the argument that the Rammells have now presented to this Court on appeal."
Respondents' Brief at 16, emphasis added. It is the "laws are faithfully executed" part that
defendants can't get around.

Nowhere have they addressed the language of the statutes and

administrative rules that do apply, and nowhere have they cited any authority for killing stray
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livestock, either, because there isn't any.

The true "ipse dixit" - and baseless - nature of

defendants' entire attempted justification for their slaughter of a stray livestock herd is seen in the
following:
"The exercise of the Governor's authority is derived [from] a number of sources,
as indicated upon the face of the executive order itself. (R, pp. 32-33). Among
other concerns, the Governor relied upon the need to protect Idaho's wildlife, the
regulation and protection of domestic livestock interests, the protection of the
general public welfare including interests Idaho shares in common with adjoining
states and countries, the abatement of a public nuisance,2 in addition to the
specific issues related to this particular escape."
Respondents' Brief at 17, emphasis added.

These claimed "concerns" might fairly encapsulate

the concerns of Fish and Game and all of the various anti-elk ranching sportsmen's groups as
defendant Huffaker testified (see Appellants' Opening Brief at 9-12, R., p. 419-422), and as the
lower court expressed at the December 16, 2010, hearing, but they do nothing at all to obviate
the efficacy of the Legislature's enactment of Title 25, Chapter 37 and Chapter 23 over and

despite those concerns.
If the defendants' argument were accepted by this Court in this case, it would empower
the executive branch of the government to eviscerate the will of the legislative branch by the
simple expedient of declaring itself "concerned" and signing an executive fiat.

Elk are

livestock, I.C. §25-3701, 3707. Cattle are livestock. When livestock get out, they become
"Estrays," Title 25, Chapter 23. Notwithstanding the lower court's claimed personal expertise in
things elk-y, the elected Idaho Legislature took special pains to ensure that everybody knew
domestic elk were to be treated the same as cattle. Now, then: Suppose the animals that got out
in this case were beef cattle, instead of domestic elk. And suppose further the governor issued

This one isn't really even in the executive order. Its only existence in the case is in the lower
court's footnote 7 (R., p. 114), which itself merely volunteered the unremarkable fact there is
such a doctrine in the common law. Once so suggested, of course, the defendants then and only
then followed that lead and began claiming it applied in the instant case.
2
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the same executive order he did in this case (R., p. 000032-33), including the listing of all his
claimed "concerns." And finally, suppose the "shooter teams," the helicopter and the airplane all
did what they did here, and slaughtered as many of the rancher's cattle as they possibly could.
Would the State be heard to claim, for justification, that the governor had listed the foregoing
"concerns" as a sufficient substitute for legislative authority?
Clearly not, and the only difference between that scenario and this one is that the former
would have likely got the governor thrown out of office, instead of elected again - to an even
more powerful one.
5.

The private individuals the State enlisted to help slaughter plaintiffs' livestock
were not "licensed hunters" as the term is used in I.e. §25-3705A(3).

A significant "tell" occurs in Respondents' Brief at 18:
"In addition, nowhere in their appellate argument have the Rammells actually
argued and established that any of their domestic elk was actually killed by
anyone who was not a licensed Idaho hunter who was [
] entitled to the
immunity afforded by I.C. §25-3705A(3), or that the State and its agents were not
entitled to the immunity provided by extension under this statute for such noncompensated takings that were made by licensed hunters. "
Respondents' Brief at 18, emphasis added. If the State-enlisted private party shooters were in
fact "Joe Hunter" who while hunting wild elk hit one that was in fact a seven-day escaped
domestic one, there would be no need for any "extension" to afford State immunity, because the
statute specifically so provides. The "extension" the defendants need here is to extend the "Joe
Hunter" provision to the people the State specifically authorized to go kill as many of plaintiffs
animals as they possibly could (Executive Order, Paragraph 3 a - c, R. p. 000032-33), and that
flies in the face of the unmistakable intent of the statutory scheme to condone and protect this
relatively new and highly controversial industry. Moreover, defendants have admitted that such
persons who were government employees were not the "licensed hunters" contemplated by I.e.
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§25-3705A(3), from which it follows that neither were the private individuals the State
specifically enlisted to help:
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 71: Admit or deny that IDFG and/or ISDA
employees, who were purportedly authorized by Executive Order 2006-32 to kill
plaintiffs' elk, did not become "licensed hunters" under Idaho Code §25-3705A(3)
by virtue of the Executive Order.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 71:
Qualified admission. See Response to Request for Admission no. 72.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 72: Admit or deny that IDFG and/or ISDA
employees, who were purportedly authorized by Executive Order 2006-32 to kill
plaintiffs' elk, did not become "licensed hunters" under Idaho Code §25-3705A(3)
by virtue of the "RULES" promulgated by the Idaho Fish and Game Commission,
a copy of which rules are set forth in the document Bates Nos. PLF 02068-02070.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 72:
Qualified admission. The terms and conditions of Executive Order no. 2006-32
authorize Idaho Department of Fish and Game and the Idaho Department of
Agriculture to "immediately identify and shoot on site any domestic elk that have
escaped from the Conant Creek Facility .... "
R., p. 342.3 The distinction between "Joe Hunter" and the State's operatives in the intentional
destruction of plaintiffs' livestock is reflected in defendant Huffaker's deposition, too:

3 The purported qualifications of these admissions should be ignored for the same reason evasive
denials may be ignored because, like most ofthe defendants' attempts to avoid the intent of Rule
36, I.R.C.P., they do not comply with the rule and thus may be deemed admissions,just as ifthe
party failed to respond at all:
Rule 36(a) provides that a matter may be deemed admitted if the answer "does not
comply with the requirements of this rule." It is undisputed that failure to answer
or object to a proper request for admission is itself an admission: the Rule itself so
states. It is also clear that an evasive denial, one that does not "specifically deny
the matter," or a response that does not set forth "in detail" the reasons why the
answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter, may be deemed an
admission. See, e. g., Havenfield Corp. v. H & R Block, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 93, 96-97
(W.D.Mo.1973). Since such a response does not comply with the literal
requirements of Rule 36(a), the district court may, in its discretion, deem the
matter admitted.
Asea, Inc. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 12452 (9th Cir. Cal. 1981), emphasis
added. See also, In re Katrina Canal Breach Litigation, 2007 WL 1959193, 1-2; Miller v.
Holzmann, 240 F.R.D. 1,4 (D. D.C. 2006). Rule 36 can pare cases to the bone, if enforced.
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46
Q. Okay. So if! understand the chronology
correctly, employees of your department commenced
shooting the elk earlier, but then by the 19th you
determined that you needed the assistance of private
parties as well and so you enlisted the aid of the
private hunters to -A. That's correct.
Q. -- conduct this depredation hunt?
47
A. Yep.
MR. FUREY: Okay.
(Exhibit 10 was marked for identification
and a copy is attached hereto.)
BY MR. FUREY:
Q. Mr. Huffaker, Exhibit 10 is a single-page
document dated October 12,2006 carrying Bates No. PLF
02078, the salutation of which is "Dear Landowner,"
and it was apparently sent out by Steve Schmidt,
regional supervisor.
As I read this, it appears to me that it's
simply an advisory by the regional supervisor of the
Idaho Department ofFish and Game to either a private
land owner or multiple private land owners explaining
that the project is extended until October 31.
Am I encapsulating it fairly and
correctly?
A. I believe so. The -- the way I remember
this document is that the region recommended to me
that we extend the hunt for the local land owners,
who -- who still would be those most likely to be able
to identify and take these domestic elk on -- on their
property, so that's what we did.

Huffaker depo., p. 46. L. 18 - p. 47, L. 23, (R. p. 342).
Nothing in I.e. §25-3705A was ever intended by the legislature or anyone else to apply
to what the defendants did in this case. It was simply latched onto out of context and used as an
excuse.
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6.

Defendant Risch could not have "reasonably but mistakenly" believed that his
conduct did not violate plaintiffs' clearly established property rights.
With every page of defendants' brief, their position weakens, until at page 27 they nearly

admit what plaintiffs have said all along, i.e., the defendants' acts violated the plaintiffs' clearly
established rights in and to their livestock:
"Ultimately, the question in respect to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
as the District Court correct[ly]stated, is not whether the official did or did not
actually violate clearly established law. (R., p. 119 Miller v.Idaho State Patrol,
150 Idaho 856, 869, 252 P.3rd 1274, 1287 (2011) ("[t]he qualified immunity
standard 'gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting 'all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law[4].'" quoting from,
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534,537, 116 L.Ed.2d 589,
596(1991) and Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341-43, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096-97,
89 L.Ed.2d 271, 278-79 (1986).
There are no prior Idaho appellate cases that have construed and applied
I.C. § 25-3705A. When the law remains undeveloped, or the applicable principles
are too uncertain, then an official should be granted immunity if he could have
reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that his conduct did not violate the right.
Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856,869,252 P.3rd 1274, 1287 (2011)."
Respondents' Brief at 28.
If defendants' acts were immunized by I.C. § 25-3705A, as the lower court found after it
flip-flopped from
"Finally, even the language of I.e. §25-3705A itself appears to indicate an
intention to insulate licensed hunters, and the state agencies who licensed those
hunters, from liability for inadvertently killing and taking domestic cervidae that
have escaped for more than seven (7) days * * *
(R., p. 114, emphasis added) to "I do agree with [plaintiffs] counsel, it's not ambiguous, but I

think his interpretation isjustflat wrong," (December 16,2010, Tr., p. 46, L. 18 -20), then (a)
they'd be highly motivated by self-interest to actually quote and discuss that language - which
they haven't done, anywhere in their entire brief, and (b) they'd have no motivation to rely as

4 Precisely as plaintiffs maintain occurred here.
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heavily as they do on the "reasonable but mistaken" excuse that affords the claimed basis for
their "qualified immunity" defense.
The reality is that no one could genuinely read I.C. § 25-3705A(3) and the related
administrative rules as authorizing what the defendants did here, which in turn explains' why
nowhere in their brief have defendants actually set forth the text of the statute and the rules and
tried to explain how they could possibly be wrenched into something that would help them
escape liability for their actions.

Finally, even if there were any headspace for a "reasonable but mistaken" take on the
import of I.C. § 25-3705A(3), the claimed reasonableness of that take would present a question
of fact for the jury - not for the lower court on a motion by the State and U.S. Senator Risch for
summary judgment. Jackson v. City ofPittsburg, 2010 WL 2347085 at 6-7 (2010).

7.

Attorney fees.

As discussed in appellants' opening brief, it is apparent that defendants' claim for attorney
fees, like their counterclaim for the cost of the destruction of plaintiffs' livestock, was urged for
no greater purpose than to create a bargaining chip with which to dissuade plaintiff from
challenging what occurred below. It didn't work, even though the lower court did give them
about half of what they asked for.
The claim that plaintiffs have brought this case "without basis in law or fact" is specious.
The law is the Fifth Amendment to the constitution's prohibition of governmental taking of
private property without due process and without just compensation, together with an actual
examination of the language of the applicable statutes and administrative rules, which discloses
that the defendants' reliance upon them as purported justification for the intentional destruction
of plaintiffs' property was a sham. The facts are that the defendants intentionally destroyed
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plaintiffs' property without due process and without the payment of just compensation. The
award of attorney fees was plain error.
8.

Reassignment on remand.

Plaintiffs recogruze that if they prevail in this appeal, they will have the right to
disqualify former fish and game attorney, now judge, Copsey on remand.

However, the

enormity of the error committed here - by a trial court that should have recused itself sua sponte
once it realized how antithetical its own firmly held views were to one of the "sides" in the casewarrants comment and deterrence by this Court.
Defendants point out plaintiffs did not move to disqualify the lower court in those
proceedings, which is true. But until the court conducted the December 16, 2010, hearing as it
did (transcript appended), it could not be known just how firmly devoted to its personally held
views that court really was.

Roger Fuhrman, Fish and Game's P.R. chief, couldn't have argued

the case for defendants more forcefully.
Conclusion.

It is submitted that never in a million years would then-governor (now U.S. Senator)
Risch have ordered the summary destruction of state senator Jeff Siddoway's elk herd had it
been those that became strays for a few weeks instead of plaintiff's. Indeed, never before in the
history of the program had any strays been destroyed by the State, and the occasional escape was
neither uncommon nor unexpected - in other words, they sometimes got out, just like beef
livestock do.
The reality here, though, is that whereas elk ranching generally is an easy target with Fish
and Game and the huge sportsman voter bloc, the particular ownership of these animals must
have made them especially so. It's no stretch to imagine early reports in the governor's office:
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"There's over a hundred domestic elk out and they're probably X's!" "Whose?!" "X's!!" "You
gotta be kiddin' me. That's just too perfect."
While the lower court on December 16, 2010, made an emphatic point that "there is
absolutely zero 5 evidence of any malicious intent or any attempt to retaliate or any of the other
things that were in some of those affidavits," December 16, 2010 Tr., P. 55, L. 25-P. 52, L. 3
(attached as Appendix), the natural, indisputable fact - established without qualification by the
sworn testimony of both the Administrator of the Department of Agriculture, Dr. Greg Ledbetter,
and the Director of the Department of Fish and Game, Steve Huffaker - is that there was a very
real, very significant institutional prejudice against elk ranching at Fish and Game and among the
hunting public. It was those factions the governor consulted, to the exclusion of the Department
of Agriculture - notwithstanding the entire program had been transferred/rom Fish and Game to
the Department of Agriculture.
The fishers and the hunters had made their calls for the actual elimination of elk ranching
"loud and clear" to the Department of Fish and Game. When the plantiffs' livestock got out, the
roar of the crowd would certainly cheer the governor for blowing them off the map. After all,
what better way to put an especially noisy one of these outfits out of business than by killing its
livestock and then refusing reimbursement?
~

But it was illegal.

Respectfully submitted this

\0 day of November, 2011.
.....
. Furey, Attorney'at Law
Counsel for plaintiffs-appellants

5

Holding thumb to forefinger for effect.
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I hereby certify that on the
of November, 2011, I served three true and correct
copies of the foregoing on each of the following (for a total of six on defendants/respondents) by
the means indicated:
Michael E. Kelly
LOPEZ & KELL Y, PLLC
413 W. Idaho Street - Ste. 100
Post Office Box 856
Boise,ID 83701
Facsimile:
(208) 342-4344
Email: mek@idahodefense.com
o Facsimile to (208) 342-4344

o U. S. Mail

~Hand delivery

o U. S. Mail

¥ Hand delivery

Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General, State of Idaho
700 W. Jefferson Street
P.O. Box 8370
Boise
Idaho 83720-0010
Facsimile:
(208) 854-8071
o Facsimile to (208) 854-8071
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taking, not the state. However, they expanded the
liability base for the hunter in doing that so as
to include the state so that if a hunter did that,
the state wouldn't get sued.
So we believe that was the
inappropriate statutory -- or the improper use of
a statutory base to allow the governor to proceed.
Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you very much. Mr. Kelly,
any brief response?
MS. KELLY: Just briefly, Your Honor.
I think -- for the purpose of this
motion again, Your Honor, I think the facts as set
out in the complaint are all we need to hear in
this matter. What Mr. Runft gave you, while maybe
interesting, has no bearing on this matter. It's
not Idaho information. It's got nothing to do
with Idaho. It's Montana information related
presumably to Montana statute. So I don't think
that really expands this out past a 12(b)(6)
motion.
So I think everything we presented in
our briefs is all the court needs to rule on these
motions.
And to specifically address some of
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Mr. Runft's argument, the trigger here is not
infection of livestock. It's not contagious -- a
contagious disease of livestock. It's the escape.
There's specific statutes that we've
discussed all day regarding domestic cervidae.
There is a whole other section, a whole other
statutory scheme regarding livestock. Cervidae
are defined -- domestic cervidae are defined. And
what we have is an elk ranch and elk are domestic
cervidae. And under the statutes we've discussed
today under Title 25, Chapter 37, domestic
cervidae can be taken and they can be taken by
hunters. And I believe that provides the immunity
that should be awarded to the state in the matter
under the statutory scheme.
And I don't think -- again, in regard
to either the executive or qualified immunity or
the discretionary immunity, those are ancillary
arguments which I think equally apply to the
individuals in this matter. Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate the
fine work that both counsel have done. It's an
area that I'm very interested in and have been for
years. I really enjoy fish and game law. I think
it's fascinating. I also like dealing with fish
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and game people because they're interesting
people.
I'm going to take this under
advisement. I think it's -- it's a unique case.
So I'm going to take it under advisement and issue
a written decision. It may take a couple of
weeks, if that's okay with the parties. And I
want to thank you very much for your participation
today. Thank you very much.
MR. KELLY: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. RUNFT: Thank you.
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THE COURT: All right. I want everyone to
know that I have read all of the material and in
fact went back and read all of the motions that
have been filed. I've read everything in the file
again and I will be able to rule from the bench
when we're finished today.
Each side gets a total of 15 minutes.
I've read your material. So don't repeat what's
in there unless there's something you want to
emphasize. Sorry. I ran down the hall.
So if you want to go ahead, it is your
motion. You may proceed, counsel.
MR. KELLY: Thank you, Your Honor. Your
Honor, as the court and Mr. Furey are aware, we're
moving for summary judgment today on the
plaintiff's first amended complaint.
Subsequent to filing the motion, the
court asked the parties to address three
additional issues -- or three specific issues.
One being whether the -- Counts Six and Seven, the
emotional distress claims filed under 1983 are
tort claims, whether the statute at issue,
25-370SA is constitutional; and whether the 1983
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claims can actually withstand summary judgment on
an objective standard basis, is my understanding
of the issues and how the court had framed them.
Simply, Your Honor, I'll address those
three issues as quickly as possible. Essentially
in regard to Counts Six and Seven, it's the
defendant's position that those claims are not
1983 claims. They could be, but they're not. We
-- we cited a case, Carey v. Piphus, which there
is a narrow opening there where emotional tort -emotional distress claim can be a 1983 claim.
THE COURT: It still has to stem from a
constitutional violation.
MR. KELLY: Right.
THE COURT: You certainly can get -- you can
get damages that could be emotional distress, but
they all still must stem from the violation
itself.
MR. KELLY: Correct, Your Honor. And that's
where I was kind of going with this. I mean, the
only thing I did was come up with an example as to
how this would fit in and why it doesn't here.
Your Honor, I think -- essentially in
this instance I think the plaintiffs would have to
allege that they were distraught and got headaches
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and went to the doctor because they didn't get a
hearing before the elk were destroyed. That's the
best example I could come up with.
In that regard because the facts don't
fit that situation, I don't believe it's -- we
don't believe it's a 1983 claim. And, in essence,
because they are then tort claims, we believe that
those two claims fall under the same discretionary
function exemptions -- exceptions that the tort
claims from the first complaint fell under.
THE COURT: Well, I don't think you even
have to go that far. You simply cannot as a
matter of a 1983 claim make it based on a tort.
MR. KELLY: Well, I'm giving all of the
alternatives, judge.
THE COURT: Right. I mean, I don't want to
go start down the road now of starting to look to
see whether it fits within the Tort Claims Act.
They specifically did not allege a tort claim
under the Tort Claims Act.
MR. KELLY: Correct. I'm just saying that
as -- if we take it one step further. Again, I
think the cases that the court cited to the
parties, Baker v. McCall and Estelle v. Gamble,
fit right in on all fours with the situation we
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have here.
In regard to Counts One and Two and
whether they're constitutional, I think quite
honestly, judge, in the plaintiff's briefing they
actually conceded that the statute is
constitutional. I think their -- the plaintiffs
take on this was whether actually we -- the state
had authority to act under that statute.
Nevertheless looking at the
constitutionality issue, the Idaho constitution
provides the state with the police power to
regulate its statutes. In this case it provides
the state with police power with respect to
livestock.
THE COURT: Well, doesn't it also, counsel,
whether you go under the livestock provision or
whether you go under the provision they have the
right to protect on behalf of all the citizenry
the wildlife which is owned essentially by the
state, either one gives them authority to pass
regulations to protect that wildlife?
MR. KELLY: Oh, absolutely, judge.
Absolutely. That's the -- again, I'm just trying
to layout as much as I can as far as foundation
for that support that is constitutional. And, you
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know, that was kind of my next step, that, you
know, the state has the right and the obligation
to protect the citizenry, the wildlife, and
basically just the overall public welfare
interest. And that in and of itself makes it
6 constitutional.
In that regard the governor's issuance
7
8 of the order in essence makes the ultimate
9 destruction of the plaintiffs' elk either not a
10 taking at all or a legal taking, and thereby
11 they're not entitled to compensation.
And then finally, judge, my CliffsNotes
12
version
of
all of this, Counts Two -- excuse me,
13
14 Three, Four and Five on the -- the remaining 1983
15 claims, I don't think there's anything different
16 in the first amended complaint than what was
17 alleged in the original complaint in this matter.
There's a couple of new facts with
18
19 twists put in there; one being a subjective
20 allegation that there was a retaliatory motive.
21 You know, I think we addressed that, judge, in our
22 original briefing that even if there's a
23 subjective standard, which under Harlow there's
24 not anymore, the plaintiff's own statement would
25 indicate they didn't know Governor Risch ahead of
1
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3
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time, they didn't know Mr. Huffaker ahead of time.
Thereby there really is no retaliatory motive
involved. Anyway -- but regardless it doesn't -it doesn't apply.
And under the same objective standard
that was addressed the first time around with the
court, I believe that these three claims again
should be barred under the qualified immunity
provided to these -- these players.
And this -- as an aside, I know this
was addressed the first time around by the court,
but in looking over the complaint, the first
amended complaint, I'm still not sure what the
allegations are against Mr. Huffaker other than
the fact that he carried out the order by Governor
Risch. Nevertheless he should likewise be
dismissed from this action.
Other than that, judge, unless you have
any questions, I don't have any further comments.
THE COURT: No.
MR. KELLY: Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Furey; right? Mr.
Mr. Furey.
MR. FUREY: I'm sorry?
THE COURT: Mr. Furey.
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MR. FUREY: Furey.
THE COURT: Furey. I apologize.
MR. FUREY: Thank you. That's -- that's
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fine.
Your Honor, with respect to the state's
authority to enact regulations for the protection
of both livestock and wildlife, certainly they do.
But in this instance the protections that the
legislature in its own wisdom and in the
fulfillment of those powers committed to it has
seen fit not to authorize the killing or
destruction of the livestock simply for failing to
remain within the confines of the -THE COURT: On the contrary, that statute
specifically says that they can.
MR. FUREY: Which statute, Your Honor?
THE COURT: That's the statute that I asked
everyone to decide.
MR. FUREY: 3705A?
THE COURT: Yes, subsection (3). It
authorizes it where the escape -- where the
animals escaped for more than seven days. In this
case they had escaped for a lot longer than seven
days.
MR. FUREY: Certainly they had been at large

32

31
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

for longer than seven days, Your Honor, but with
respect to the court's -- what the court
ascertains the statute to read is what the court
ascertains it to be. But for the protection of my
record so I'm not met with having failed to make
my client's position, I do differ with the court's
interpretation because I think all -- all 3705A
does is provide that the licensed hunter who takes
a domestic elk in compliance with Title 36, which,
of course, is the Fish & Game statutes, in other
words, during the season, it simply cannot be
found liable to the owner of the elk, nor for that
matter can the agency, the Fish & Game or the
state.
I -- with all due prospect, Your Honor,
I must differ that that statute simply does not
provide that on the eighth day the state is
authorized to kill the elk. The state is
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authorized to kill the elk under Rule 303 and Rule
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305 in the event there's an animal health
emergency or in the event of exposure to or
affectation, I guess, with disease. The state is
likewise authored to dispose of this livestock
under Title 25, Chapters Two, Three, Four and Six,
which, of course, are the tuberculosis or the
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bang's or brucellosis statutory provisions.
But the only - the only provision
pertinent to escape given the -- even the very
titles of the rules are that if the administrator
determines that the owner has failed to get them
in -- recover them in a timely fashion, and it
specifically says as determined by the
administrator, then in that event the department
of agriculture is authorized to effect the capture
of the animals. Those are -- that is right in the
actual verbatim regulation implementing 3705 by
the agency that has been specifically entrusted
with that bailiwick.
I guess I'm repeating myself, but the
seven-day provision is simply to give the domestic
elk rancher a king's X for seven days if they get
out during hunting season and then after that if
he still hasn't gotten them back in, too bad
because obviously the hunters who don't even
resemble elk and wear nonetheless hunter orange so
as to not be confused with game will undoubtedly
shoot them. And that's really all in the rule
3705A with the seven-day provision does.
I think it's fundamental to this case
to recognize something that Justice Kennedy had in
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his concurrence in Crawford-El, the department of
corrections, when -- he pointed out that 1983
actions can illustrate the best of our legal order
and the worst of our legal order. And as it
illustrates the best of our legal order, he
pointed out that it allows even prisoners to the
protection of the constitution and all of
government has to comply with it.
Domestic elk ranching isn't a popular
occupation. I understand the lack of popularity.
I don't like it myself, but I'm not the
legislature and the legislature for reasons known
to it made Idaho one of a tiny handful of states
that specifically went out of its way to authorize
this as an agricultural pursuit and to make sure
everyone understood that if they get out, that
doesn't alter the fact that they are nonetheless
property and that the owner has absolute rights on
them at all.
Again, there is -- there is simply no
statute, no regulation that says on the eighth day
the state can kill escaped domestic elk. There
isn't one.
With respect to the -- the emotional
distress claims, I recognize what the law is on
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that and that it simply can't stem from garden
variety cases that the court was kind enough to
bring to my attention when I first arrived in this
case and I understand that. Although I do think,
A, as the court indicated, they are nonetheless
items of compensable damage. And moreover, B, I
think in this case one of the -- one of the
particular aspects of the impact that it had on
the plaintiffs was the essentially totalitarian
aspect of the deprivation of the opportunity to
say, no, wait a minute, this is my position on
this before summarily exterminating them.
And I think all of the cases that I've
seen so far are consistent with the fact that
absent disease or at least a reasonable belief of
disease, the state simply -- no states are
authorized to just go forth and destroy property.
Every single case that the defendants have cited
where animals were found to constitute a public
nuisance and thus present a situation that could
properly be constitutionally abated by the state
involved disease, actual-THE COURT: But you have to remember,
counsel, that the domestic -- the domestic elk,
any cervidae, they are different from other
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livestock in that they can mate with the wild
population. And the 9th Circuit as well as the
Supreme Court has made it clear that a state has
an interest in protecting the native wildlife on
behalf of its citizens not just from diseases and
parasites, but also to maintain the genetic purity
of the wildlife to protect the wildlife in
competition for forage and habitat.
So that's the thing that you're
forgetting, is that they are not like cattle.
Cattle can go out and they're not going to mate
with the elk. These elk, however, can. And the
state has a legitimate interest in protecting the
native wildlife to maintain that genetic purity.
That's what makes it different.
:MR. FUREY: All right. If I could respond
to that, Your Honor. With respect to the 9th
Circuit case, which was Pacific Northwest Venison

1 different because if it's legal and constitutional
2 to outlaw an activity, then it's constitutional to
3 put limitations on that activity. And because
4 these particular animals are different from other
5 livestock, the state has a different interest in
6 protecting the native population.
.MR. FUREY: I'm following and in agreement
7
8 so far, but where we -- where my position parts
9 company with the court's analysis is that in
10 Washington certainly they did declare - that the
11 legislature did declare an outright ban, which, of
12 course, was within its province and power. Idaho
13 on the other hand has done just the opposite. And
14 had Idaho chosen either to ban them outright or
15 out of a concern for, as you point out, the fact
16 that these -- and I think it's conceded on all
17 hands -- were genetically pure Rocky Mountain elk.
THE COURT: That's not the point because
18

19

Growers --
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THE COURT: Yes.
:MR. FUREY: -- that case was decided on the
fact that Washington unlike Idaho had specifically
declared illegal the possession of elk.
THE COURT: But it's really not -- actually
with due respect, counsel, it's really not any
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you're -- that's a judgment after the fact. The
rationale behind the law is to insure that there
is continued genetic purity as well as to make
sure there is no passing on certain genetic
defects. It is irrelevant that subsequent to the
escape and subsequent to the destruction of some
of those animals, they were found to be pure. It
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1 doesn't make any difference because that's not the
2 purpose behind the statute.
3
MR. FUREY: And then to go ahead and make
4 the rest of my record, had Idaho determined that
5 the threat of -- of genetic defected interbreeding
S
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between domestic elk and wild elk was not
adequately protected by the big screen that exists
at the borders and all -- all of the regulatory
provisions that are designed to prevent genetic
mutants from entering the state -THE COURT: And just so you understand,
counsel, it's not just genetic mutation. What it
is is that when you have a domesticated set of
animals, they inbreed -- or they can inbreed and
that's where you get ultimately what they call
genetic drift. But the state is within its
authority to require them to be penned and to
provide for what would happen if they escape.
MR. FUREY: And, again, to just continue
with what I was saying, Your Honor, had Idal10
determined that the big screen at the border was
inadequate and they needed a second screen that
was a black and white if they're on this side of
the fence for more than seven days, they shall be
destroyed, the legislature could have done so. I
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maintain it did not. I understand the court says
they did. If they did, I think that would clearly
be within the legislature'S province. But I don't
read the statute that way.
So there it is. Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything further, counsel?
MR. KELLY: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you have any response to -apparently his basic claim that he's making is the
statute is ambiguous.
MR. FUREY: Not at all, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Or does not say what the state
says it says.
MR. FUREY: Thank you.
MR. KELLY: Well, just briefly, Your Honor.
I think, at least what I'm gleaning from the
argument and from the briefing, that plaintiffs'
taken the position that the statute only provides
for accidental taking -- or incidental taking,
excuse me, and I don't think that, in fact, is
true. Paragraph three discusses how there is a
legal taking if the hunter complies with the rules
and the promulgations of the Idaho Fish and Garne
Department.
Clearly fish and game promulgated the
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specific rules on what -- how to follow this hunt

2 regarding the Ran1mell elk which included the
3 ability to take multiple animals. So that in and
4 of itself tells you it's not an incidental taking
5 statute.
That's all I have to say on that,
6
judge.
Thank
you.
7
8
THE COURT: All right. As I said, I did a
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lot of research in this.
I'm going to start in a little bit
different order than what the parties have
started, and that is that I'm going to talk first
about the individual defendants, Risch and
Huffaker. And I'll note that the plaintiffs have
not sued the state on any 1983 claims because, in
fact, they can't.
So they have sued both Risch and
Huffaker under -- and they have a number of
counts. I believe it's Counts Three, Four, Five,
Six and Seven. Those are all 1983 claims alleged
against Risch and Huffaker.
Now, first as to Huffaker, I do want to
as an aside say that I don't understand the
allegations against Huffaker, but it doesn't make
any difference because the analysis really is the
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same. And I'm going to find that they enjoyed the
qualified in1munity for their actions for basically
the same reasons that I set forth in my original
decision.
I agree with the defendant that the
test under Harlow versus Fitzgerald is an
objective one. I don't think anyone really argues
otherwise.
What that means, therefore, is the
9
10 subjective intent of the officials is irrelevant.
11 And the case law -- and that's -- Crawford-El that
12 both parties have talked about makes it clear that
13 a state official's motive is irrelevant to the
14 analysis. You look at it from an objective
15 standpoint.
Therefore, unless the actions taken
16
17 violate clearly established law, the state
18 official's action are immunized. And in this case
19 I find that the reasonable person objectively
20 would have believed, regardless of whether it's
21 true or not, that they had authority to go forward
22 with the actions that were authorized by Governor
23 Risch. I don't find that there's any -- that they
24 took any action that violated clearly established
25 law. And, therefore, I'm going to grant Risch's
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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and Huffaker's motion.
I do want to state as an aside -- but I
want to make it very clear that my decision does
not rely on this, but as an aside, and this
becomes important for another issue that we're
going to talk about at the end, I note that
contrary to the affidavits that were filed in
support of amending the original complaint, it
does not appear to me that the Rammells have any,
zero evidence, zero evidence of any ill motive or
any of these retaliations or all of the things
that were in their affidavit.
I only bring that up because
unfortunately you were not their attorney at the
time, but I made it clear that if there was not a
factual basis for those assertions, then I
intended to impose costs and fees.
Now, the court also dismisses -- and so
as to the 1983 actions against Risch and Huffaker,
they're dismissed. There's qualified immunity.
The real issue then becomes Counts One
and Two as to whether -- and in essence what's
happening is that the Rammells are asserting what
could be called I guess an inverse condemnation
claim b.ecause they don't have a claim for damage
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against the state under 1983 and these aren't
pursued under 1983.
The court also dismiss -- dismisses
Counts One and Two. And I want to kind of make it
clear a couple things and this is the reason I
asked the parties to brief this. That while the
court denied the motion to dismiss originally -on the original Counts One and Two which allege an
unconstitutional taking, the court did nofrule on
the constitutionality of the actions or the
constitutionality of the statute in question or
upon which the state relied, which is Idaho Code
25-3705A(3).
And I did that because my understanding
of the briefings is that it was not really
addressed by the parties. And, therefore, I would
note that a careful reading of the court's earlier
decision suggested clearly to the parties that the
constitutionality of the statute is what needed to
be addressed by the parties, which is what the
parties have now done. The court finds that it is
constitutional, and, therefore, the state did not
violate the takings clause or due process clauses
of either the state or the federal constitution or
of the eminent domain clause of the state
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constitution.
I generally incorporate the state's
analysis, but more specifically I want to kind of
explain a number of other things. I think the
parties understand it's long been the rule that
private property can be destroyed without
compensation under the public nuisance doctrine
where that property was diseased or where it is an
unreasonable -- makes an unreasonable interference
with a right common to the general public.
Therefore, while the legislature has
specifically decided to compensate certain farmers
and ranchers including those that farm or ranch
domestic cervidae for the destruction of their
animals destroyed because of certain identified
diseases -- and they clearly have the authority to
provide for that compensation if they wish. They
are not -- I want to make it clear, they're not
required to. That's not constitutionally -they're not required to where they destroy animals
because of disease. But here in the state of
Idaho they've carved out an exception.
Clearly the fact that the legislature
chose to provide compensation in one instance does
not mean it is compelled to provide compensation
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in all instances. Therefore, the court finds that
the legislation can constitutionally carve out
3 exceptions while -- and I find that that's what it
4 did in enacting Idaho Code 25-3705(3).
I also find that the state of Idaho has
5
6 an interest in protecting its native wildlife on
7 behalf of all of its citizens from diseases and
8 parasites, but in addition to maintaining the
9 genetic purity of its wildlife, protecting its
10 wildlife from competition for forage and habitat
11 and insuring that the native wildlife will not be
12 captured or added to captive herds. And
13 vice-versa, that captive herds will not become
14 part of native wildlife. And both parties are
15 aware that that's the Pacific Northwest Venison
16 Producers case, a 9th Circuit case, 1994.
And as my conversation with counsel
17
18 indicates, my feeling is if it's constitutional to
preclude what could be a lawful enterprise based
19
20 on these interests, then clearly the state has the
21 authority to regulate and determine what is
22 compensable. I'm also relying on the Hughes
23 versus Oklahoma case at 441 U.S. 322.
The fact that the legislature has
24
indicated
that domestic cervidae are livestock for
25
1

2
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some purposes does not mean that they are -- that
they will be entitled to be treated equally in all
purposes -- for all purposes. As I indicated in
my conversation with counsel, cervidae are
different from other livestock. They, unlike
ca ttle or swine or sheep or similar animals, can
mate with native wildlife potentially affecting
the genetic purity of the native wildlife and
making their regulations unique and different from
other livestock in some -- in some instances.
That is why is the legislature's action
in allowing fish and game and the state to provide
for, and I believe that this statute clearly
allows them to provide for, a manner in which the
animals can be destroyed because if they're
hunted, they're destroyed. I don't think
counsel's interpretation makes sense and the
reason I don't think it makes sense is that it
requires -- in order for -- it's not the
accidental taking. It's the purposeful taking.
And I say that because of the fact that fish and
game cannot authorize the taking of those animals
until the domestic cervidae have been -- have
escaped the control of the owner for more than
seven days. If it were just to cover accidental
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taking, then it wouldn't have a number of days
that they have to wait before they can issue this
proclamation.
And it has to be done by proclamation
because it says taken by a licensed hunter in a
manner which complies with Title 36. In other
words, they have to comply with the requirement
that they have a license and all of the things
that are required and the rules and proclamations,
proclamations of the Idaho fish and game
commissioner -- commission and if they do take, it
is considered a legal taking. It immunizes not
just the hunter, but it also immunizes the state
agency and the state which suggests that it is to
immunize them from an imminent domain argument.
That's the reason for it. It makes no sense to
have any other interpretation of the statute. I
don't think it's ambiguous. I do agree with
counsel, it's not ambiguous, but I think his
interpretation is just flat wrong.
And, like I said, it makes no sense
that if it's just to preclude accidental taking,
then you wouldn't need the seven days and you
wouldn't need the proclamation. They would just
have to be escaped. And they could say that.
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They could have easily said if there's an
accidental taking by a licensed hunter who was in
compliance with Title 36 of a domesticated -- a
domestic cervidae who has escaped regardless of
how long it is, then that -- they could certainly
do that. That's not what they did.
And they also -- this is 2004 when it
was added, they also put duties on the owners and
operators to take reasonable action to prevent
escape, to insure that their fences and gates are
built and maintained to prevent escape and to
notify the Division of Animal Industries upon
discovery and to take reasonable action to bring
it under control.
In this case due process was -- was
clearly prOVided. There was notice given to the
Rammells as to the escape. They were given an
opportunity to get the animals under control.
They didn't get them under control. Almost-it's almost a month later before the proclamation
was actually issued so that there could be legal
taking of the animals.
Again, whether -- whether these animals
ultimately were found to be deceased is
irrelevant. It's irrelevant. The reliance on
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1 this statute, the reliance on the lack of disease
2 after the fact determination that the destroyed
3 elk were not diseased -- and this is the real
4 point. It's the escape that triggers the
5 allowance of the taking, not the disease. TI,ere
6 are already provisions that deal with disease.
7 This is for a different purpose.
And the -- like I pointed out with
8
9 counsel, the reason for not allowing the escape is
10 not simply for disease. That may be one potential
11 reason, but it is not the primary reason for
12 requiring these animals to be fenced and for the
13 owner to keep them under control.
I find that because the legislature -14
legislative
actions in passing 25-3705A and not -15
16 and in not providing compensation are
17 constitutionally proper under the public nuisance
18 doctrine. The statute itself is constitutional
19 and it doesn't sound to me like the Rammells
20 really argue that it's not constitutional. They
21 just argue about what it means.
MR. FUREY: That's correct.
22
THE COURT: Okay. But I'm going to make a
23
24 finding that it is constitutional. And,
25 therefore, the court is going to dismiss all cause

Kim Madsen, Official Court Reporter, BOise, Idaho

06/07/2011 01.44.29 PM

CVOC 08 . 20694

Rammeli vs State

50

49
1

2
3

4

5
6

7

8

9

10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

of action based on any takings claims, which would
be Counts One and Two.
To the extent there are equal
protection claims, I want to make a couple of
findings. I agree with the state's analysis. I
didn't really see much in the way of analysis from
the Rammells, but clearly to the extent equal
protection applies, the analysis would -- the
analysis would be through a rationale basis.
There's no reason for strict scrutiny. There's
nothing on the means test and the Rammells have
not established a basis for their claim.
As the state argued, the relevant
classification is actually domestic elk ranchers
whose animals have escaped. It's a very narrow
classification.
I'm not sure if the Rammells would be
arguing this, but I do want to address this. To
the extent that anyone would suggest the relevant
class were all livestock -- and I get -- I get the
sense that that's kind of what the Rammells are
saying because they are relying on 25-3703, which
is a general statute, suggesting that for most
intents and purposes -- and they're really talking
about -- if you notice, that statute says the
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provisions of Chapters Two, Three, Four and Six of
Title 25 apply -- that apply to livestock,
investing animals, also apply here. That in and
of itself does not mean that -- that the
legislature is -- that the legislature -- I'm
sorry, that does not create some sort of equal
protection problem because they're not similarly
situated.
The court finds that this
classification is not -- the bottom line it's not
obviously ambiguously discriminatory, and,
therefore, the Rammells, to the extent they're
arguing equal protection claims, have utterly
failed to show an equal protection claim. And to
the extent there are any of those surviving in any
of these counts, the court dismisses them.
As to -- although the court does not
have to reach this because -- since the court is
siding with the state as to the 1983 actions as a
whole, I do want to observe that if you read the
last two claims, Count -- let's see, Six and
Seven, which are couched as 1983 claims, it is
really clear that these really aren't 1983 claims,
however you want to massage it. They really are
tort claims. And 1983 claims, while you can get
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emotional distress damages, number one, it
wouldn't be -- it would not be couched in terms of
negligent or intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Those are tort claims.
But to the extent that if they were
able to prove their 1983 claim and they had
emotional distress as a direct and proximate -- a
direct cause of the violation of civil rights,
then they don't need separate counts because it
would be subsumed into any damages that they were
eligible for getting.
So those on their face do not survive.
And I've already told everybody what the case law
is, but it is very clear the due process clause is
not implicated by the negligent act by an official
causing unintended loss or injury to life, liberty
and property. It simply doesn't exist.
And, finally, because of the court's
decision, we do not have to reach punitive
damages. First, because there are no
constitutional violations that I can see. But I
also do want to point out that while there are
these allegations which were put into the amended
complaint based on the affidavits filed by the
Rammells, there is absolutely zero evidence of any
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malicious intent or any attempt to retaliate or
any
of the other things that were in some of those
2
3 affidavits.
So I'm dismissing this complaint, this
4
5 second -- this first amended complaint with
6 prejudice. And I'm also going to entertain a
7 motion for cost and fees under -- I think it's
8 12-117. I made it clear when I granted the motion
9 to amend that if there was no factual basis for
10 the allegations, first -- I don't think there's
11 any legal basis, but if there is no factual basis
12 for the amended complaint, that I would entertain
13 a 12-117 or even a Rule 1I.
And that's why I did not allow the
14
parties
the
-- the parties' attorneys at that time
15
16 to withdraw until all parties had actually signed
17 the pleadings under Rule 11 and that included both
18 the plaintiffs as well as their present counsel
because I was very concerned by the allegations
19
20 and made that clear to the parties.
So I will entertain a motion for costs
21
and
fees.
Certainly the other side can present
22
23 their arguments as to why I should not impose
24 costs and fees. I am dismissing -- and I would
25 ask counsel to prepare the appropriate judgment
1
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entering judgment in favor of the defendant
dismissing this case. Make sure that you do not
do just an order granting summary judgment, but
that you have a separate judgment form. The
Supreme Court's getting very, very picky about
that. And I don't -- not that I'm disagreeing
with them. I'm just suggesting that we've had
several where people get their order granting
summary judgment and then they don't present the
court with an actual judgment and the time for
appeal doesn't start until that actually is
entered.
MR. KELLY: Thank you, judge, yes.
THE COURT: Thank you. The issues are
interesting and it did bring me back to my days as
a fish and game attorney and constitutional
attorney. Yes?
MR. KELLY: Judge, one other aspect, the
state does have a counterclaim pending.
THE COURT: Oh, that's right. I forgot
about that.
MR. KELLY: I don't know how you want to do
that at this point in time.
I -- if I may speak first as far as
suggestions.
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THE COURT: I forgot about the counterclaim.
MR. KELLY: It may be worthwhile for me to
talk to counsel about how to work things out there
and then get back to the court as soon as possible
on that.
But as far as our -- our -- I know the
judge had made reference at our last hearing
potentially moving the trial date anyway if any of
the actions still existed. So I don't know what
the court's feeling is on that if we just have the
counterclaim left.
THE COURT: Well, why -- why don't we do
this. We can leave the trial on just for the
purpose of everybody appearing on that day and you
let me know what you're going to do and we can
change the trial date if we have to. Okay?
MR. KELLY: Fair enough.
THE COURT: This case has been around for a
while.
MR. KELLY: Correct. Okay.
THE COURT: It's making me look bad in front
of the Supreme Court and I'm used to that, so
that's okay. And I'm teasing. That's kind of a
joke.
MR. KELLY: I hope the record reflects that
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I laughed.
THE COURT: Yeah, everybody kind of laughed.
But I would like to -- since -actually since the counterclaim -- like I said, I
forgot about the counterclaim. Since that hasn't
been fully resolved, obviously you can't give me a
judgment form and you can't move for costs and
fees yet. Okay?
MR. KELLY: Okay.
THE COURT: But I'm signaling to the
Rammells that I'm inclined to grant costs and fees
and they'll have to really explain to me why this
is not a frivolous case. I mean, I heard the
arguments. I just -- at this point it appears to
me to be frivolous, but more importantly there's
no basis in fact, which really bothers me. So-MR. KELLY: Okay. Judge, thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. FUREY: Thank you, Your Honor.
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BOISE, IDAHO, lANUARY 6, 2011
THE COURT: We're now on record to try to
determine what's going on. My understanding is
you're not abandoning your counterclaim.
MR. KELLEY: That's correct, Your Honor.
We've had -- Mr. Furey and I have had discussions
since your ruling on the summary judgment motion
about a couple of different options. And I've
also had meetings with the client, the state
agency. At this stage they're not willing to give
up their -- the counterclaim.
THE COURT: I assume for the purposes -since this is a jury trial, for the purposes of
that that you have --and you'll be able to provide
a legal basis for the claim.
MR. KELLEY: Again, Mr. Furey and I were
just discussing it. It's a straight negligence
claim, Your Honor. There is no statutory
provision in regard to this. So it is a straight
negligence claim.
THE COURT: Your claim is that they were
negligent?
MR. KELLY: Correct.
THE COURT: Okay.
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MR. FUREY: Correct.
THE COURT: So how long is this going to
take to try?
MR. KELLY: 1 think from my perspective,
judge, 1 probably will have maybe five witnesses.
You know, a day and a half from our perspective.
You know, again, not to speak out of
tum here, but 1 offered to Mr. Furey to waive the
jury trial. I don't think that's an option at
this stage. I don't want to speak for him. 1 was
trying to come up with some other way to expedite
this and I thought maybe a bench trial would work,
potentially submitting this on the briefs or
something along those lines. 1 haven't thought
that one out. But 1 think with the jury trial 1
will probably need two days, day and a half -- day
and a half-THE COURT: This is 9:00 to 2:00. Okay.
Mr. Furey, how long are you going to need?
MR. FUREY: Probably less than one full day.
THE COURT: Okay. When you say full, I'm
9:00 to 2:00.
MR. FUREY: I understood.
THE COURT: All right. And this is -- right
now we are on schedule for 9:00 o'clock on Monday.
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Are the parties going to be prepared to go on
Monday or what do you want to do?
MR. KELLY: Judge, with the fact that we
haven't submitted any jury instructions and
pre-trial briefing, I --I actually -- I was under
the impression that when we were here the last
time -- or actually two times ago, that the court
implied that we probably wouldn't be going on
Monday, the 10th. So 1 am not prepared to go on
the 10th.
THE COURT: Do you have your calendars here
so you can schedule this?
MR. FUREY: I do Your Honor.
MR. KELLY: 1 have my unavailable dates,
judge, yes.
THE COURT: Before we start down that path,
I want to start with you. What months are you not
available?
MR. KELLY: If we're looking at three days,
judge, I could -- there's three days in March or
May. I could probably do it if we're looking at
short term.
THE COURT: That you could do it?
MR. KELLY: Yes.
THE COURT: What are those dates?
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MR. KELLY: The last two weeks, judge.
THE COURT: Of March?
MR. KELLY: That would be starting the week
of the 21st.
THE COURT: What about you Mr. Furey?
MR. FUREY: My only unavailable dates are
this month, Your Honor, and 1 could be ready to
try the case on Tuesday the 10th. The
instructions will be largely stock. As counsel
has conceded, they have no statutory authority for
the counterclaim. It's a straight common law
negligence claim. All I require to get ready are
three things: One, I want verified signatures on
my answers to interrogatories that 1 have been
trying to get since about October. Two, 1 want
the deposition of Dr. Lawrence that we scheduled
back in, I believe, September. I have been trying
to get it ever since.
THE COURT: Who is Dr. Lawrence?
MR. FUREY: She was the assistant director
or administrator of the Division of Animal
Industries.
THE COURT: What relevance is her deposition
to the counter claims?
MR. FUREY: She is the one who received the
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notification of the escape from the neighbor,
called my client, reported it to him and will
testify as to the steps he took immediately upon
such notification. She will be material to
whether my client was negligent in any particular
way or not.
THE COURT: Well, 1 think -- as I understand
the state's position, he was negligent in allowing
a hole to exist in the first place and she
certainly wouldn't have any testimony as to
that -MR. FUREY: Is the Court -THE COURT: -- and whether -- pardon?
MR. FUREY: The court's ruling I can't have
her deposition?
THE COURT: No. I'm just trying to figure
out what relevancy her deposition is going to
have.
I'll tell you, Mr. Furey, I'm kind of
concerned about increasing costs, because, as I
told -- as 1 told you, there's a strong
possibility that I would grant the state their
attorney's fees and at this point they're not
insubstantial. 1 can only guess.
So 1 don't know that -- I'm just trying
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1 to figure out how all of this is going to get paid
2 for.
3
MR. FUREY: I believe the court has reviewed
4 the depositions that have been taken so far. And
5 I know it usually takes me about 45 minutes to do
6 a deposition.
7
THE COURT: Well, that may be, but to be
8 honest with you, most of the -- in my view, most
9 of the depositions are irrelevant to the issues in
10 this case.
11
MR. FUREY: I understand that.
12
THE COURT: Because they all go to whether
13 there was disease and those kinds of things and
14 that's irrelevant.
15
But in any event what I'm looking at
16 right now is March 21st.
17
MR. FUREY: Excuse me, Your Honor. If I
18 could finish my record. The third thing I need is
19 I would like a ruling on the -20
THE COURT: Well, you've never filed a
21 motion to compel, so I don't -- I do not assume
22 that you're here to argue a motion to compel
23 because that sounds like what you are arguing.
24
MR. FUREY: The third thing is a ruling on
25 the privileged claims for the documents that have
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been withheld from us. Thank you.
THE COURT: Well, until you file a motion,
Mr. Furey, I'm not going to hear argument on it.
And there's been no motion filed. Unless the
state wants to argue it today.
MR. KELLY: No.
THE COURT: And they're willing to waive the
notice requirements. Is the state willing to do
that?
MR. KELLY: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Shall we reschedule
this for March 21st, three days?
MR. KELLY: That works for me, judge.
THE COURT: Mr. Furey, I'm not -- I'm not
precluding you from filing a motion, but in my
view you've got to file a motion.
MR. FUREY: Understood.
THE COURT: All right. So we'll set this
for March 21st at 9:00 o'clock, a three-day jury
trial. And I would like to have a pre-trial
conference so that you can provide the jury
instructions and list of witnesses to March 10th
at 4:30. So that's March 10th at 4:30.
Is there anything else we need to
schedule today?
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MR. KELLY: Not from the state's standpoint,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Furey, is there anything we
need to schedule today besides that?
MR. FUREY: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Then we'll stand in
recess until 2:30.
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